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1. Whether this Court should affirm the jury’s finding that Mr. 
Khawar was a private figure the night Sirhan Sirhan 
assassinated Senator Kennedy.
2. Whether this Court should reject Globe's attempt to invoke a 
neutral reportage privilege after its republication of 
defamatory statements.
3. Whether this Court should affirm the jury's finding that 
Globe published its article with actual malice.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
KHALID KHAWAR, ) No. S054868
)
Plaintiff and Respondent, ) Court of Appeal
) Case No. B084899
V. )
) Los Angeles
GLOBE INTERNATIONAL, INC., ) County Superior
) Court Case No.
Defendant and Appellant. ) WEC 139685
__________ ____ )
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Preliminary Statement
On August 31, 1989, respondent Khalid Khawar filed suit in 
the Superior Court of California against petitioner Globe 
International, Inc., ("Globe") seeking damages for libel.
(A.C.T, 137.) Globe's answer argued that its publication was 
constitutionally protected under a neutral reportage privilege. 
(A.C.T, 184.) After Mr. Khawar presented his evidence, Globe 
entered a motion for non-suit. (C.T. 2694.) The court denied 
Globe's motion. (C.T. 2694.) The jury returned a special 
verdict finding: (1) Mr. Khawar was a private figure, (2) Globe's 
article was a neutral and accurate report, (3) Globe published 
its article negligently, and (4) Globe published its article with 
actual malice. (A.C.T. 2782-83.) Pursuant to California Code of 
Civil Procedure section 592 the jury's finding on issues one and 
two were only advisory. CAL. CIV. PROC. § 592 (West 1996). The 
judge disagreed with the jury's finding that Globe's article was
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a neutral and accurate report, but agreed with the jury's finding 
that Mr. Khawar was a private figure. (C.T. 3109.) The jury 
awarded Mr. Khawar $1,175,000 in compensatory and punitive 
damages against Globe. (A.C.T. 2783, C.T. 3110.)
Globe filed timely notice of appeal. (C.T, 3130.) The 
Court of Appeal affirmed all four of the lower courts rulings, 
holding inter alia, that: (1) Mr, Khawar was a private figure,
(2) California does not recognize a neutral reportage privilege, 
and (3) there was substantial evidence to support the jury's 
finding that Globe published its article with malice. (C.A. 1.) 
Globe appealed to this Court which granted review on September 
25, 1996 by order No. S054868. See Khawar v. Globe Int'l, Inc.,
57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277 (1996).
Statement of Facts
On April 4, 1989 Globe published an article in its tabloid 
entitled "Former CIA agent claims: IRANIANS KILLED BOBBY KENNEDY 
FOR THE MAFIA." (C.T. 3145.) The article was referenced on 
Globe’s front page as "Iranian Secret Police Killed Bobby 
Kennedy." (C.T. 3144.) The article was written by free-lance 
reporter John Blackburn. (R.T. 1077.) Globe’s article reported 
on a book written by Robert Morrow entitled The Senator Must Die: 
The Murder of Robert F, Kennedy. (R.T. 1091.) Robert Morrow is 
a minor conspiracy theorist. (R.T. 2152.) In his book, Robert 
Morrow claims that Robert Kennedy was assassinated by the Iranian 
secret police working in conjunction with the Mafia. (C.T.
1091.) Morrow alleges that the true assassin was not Sirhan
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Sirhan but a man who called himself Ali Ahmand. (A.C.T. 150.)
Mr. Ali Ahmad is Khalid Khawar's father. {R.T. 1329.)
Four photographs appear in Robert Morrow's book below the 
caption: "Photographs of Ali Ahmand." (A.C.T. 172-73.) These 
photographs depict Mr. Khawar standing on a stage near Senator 
Kennedy on the night of the Senator's assassination. (A.C.T. 
172-73.) One of these pictures was reprinted in the Globe 
article. (C.T. 3145.) Globe centered, retouched, lightened and 
increased the size of the picture to make Mr. Khawar 
identifiable. (C.T. 3145, R.T. 2744.) Globe also added an arrow 
pointing directly to Mr. Khawar. (C.T. 3145, R.T. 2744.) Globe 
attempted to contact Ali Ahmand by calling the Los Angeles 
telephone directory, but was unsuccessful. (R.T, 1121.) Globe’s 
records do not reflect such an attempt. (R.T. 1121.) Globe did 
not contact Mr, Khawar for his response. (R.T. 1121.) Globe did 
not contact the Los Angeles Police Department trial record 
custodian, nor did it contact the Robert Kennedy Assassination 
Archives. (R.T. 1121.)
In 1962, Mr. Khawar left his native country of Pakistan to 
pursue an education in the United States. (R.T. 1331.) A small 
Pakistani periodical hired Mr. Khawar as a free-lance reported to 
recount various aspects of American culture. (R.T. 1333.) Mr. 
Khawar was issued press credentials and directed to send stories 
and pictures of prominent American figures to his homeland for 
publication. (R.T. 1333, 1336.)
On June 4, 1968, Mr, Khawar reported on Senator Robert 
Kennedy's campaign for presidency from the Ambassador Hotel in 
Los Angeles. (R.T. 1338.) Mr. Khawar stepped onto the stage
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with Senator Kennedy to obtain close-up pictures. (R.T. 1339.}
A faithful admirer of the Kennedy family, Mr. Khawar also asked a 
friend to take a picture of him near the senator. (R.T. 1339- 
40.) Mr. Khawar watched Senator Kennedy's speech and then 
watched him leave to an adjacent pantry. (R.T. 1341.) Sirhan 
Sirhan shot Senator Kennedy in the pantry with a handgun. (R.T. 
800, 1341.) Mr. Khawar tried to enter the pantry area but was 
denied access. (R.T. 1341.) Mr. Khawar cooperated fully with 
both police and FBI investigations of the assassination. (R.T. 
1342, 1351.) Mr. Khawar was one of at least 72 individuals 
interviewed after the assassination. (R.T. 686.)
Soon thereafter, Mr, Khawar returned to Pakistan but was 
over-educated and could not find employment. (R.T, 1352.) Mr. 
Khawar returned to the United States in May, 1971. (R.T. 1352.)
After working as an electrical consultant for several years, Mr. 
Khawar became a rural potato farmer. (R.T. 1354-55.)
In April 1989, a former employee notified Mr. Khawar of 
Globe's article identifying him as an Iranian secret agent 
responsible for killing Senator Kennedy. (R.T. 1359.) The 
Khawar home and car were vandalized. (R.T. 1367.) Mr. Khawar 
became scared for his life as well as for the lives of his wife 
and children. (R.T. 1360-61.) Mr. Khawar received phone calls 
linking him to the Globe article from as far away as Bangkok, 
Thailand. (R.T. 1366.) Mr. Khawar also became humiliated and 
ashamed when he received several other life-threatening phone 
calls. (R.T. 1366.) During the first phone call, Mr. Khawar 
learned that he was "going to [be] taken care of" for having 
allegedly killed Robert Kennedy. (R.T. 1416.) In another phone
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call, a man with an Arabic accent threatened to kill Mr. Khawar 
"because [he] killed Kennedy and the Arabs are being blamed for 
it." (R.T. 1416.) In the most ominous call, a man feigning an 
Indian accent warned, "[y]ou people keep buying all [the] AM-PM 
markets and ... I am going to come to your farm to kill you." 




First, Mr. Khawar is a private figure, Mr. Khawar should 
not be deemed an involuntary public figure because this status is 
inconsistent with a United States Supreme Court trend abandoning 
the status. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s rationale for the 
public figure category conflicts with an involuntary public 
figure class. Mr. Khawar should not be deemed a limited-purpose 
public figure either. Considering the nature and extent of Mr. 
Khawar's activities, Mr. Khawar did not voluntarily thrust 
himself into the forefront of a public controversy, nor did he 
have the requisite regular and continuing access to the media. 
Even if Mr. Khawar attained public figure status, the night 
Senator Kennedy was killed in 1969, he lost the status by the 
time of Globe's defamatory publication twenty-one years later.
Second, a neutral reportage privilege does not shield Globe 
from liability after republishing defamatory accusations against 
Mr. Khawar. The United States Supreme Court does not currently 
recognize a neutral reportage privilege. Likewise, California 
courts have not adopted a privilege for neutral reportage. A 
neutral reportage privilege is also in conflict with Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, and is an unduly burdensome obstacle to 
recovery. Moreover, the facts of this case render a neutral 
reportage privilege inapplicable. The defamatory statements 
reported by Globe did not originate from a credible source. 
Globe's article was not directed against a public figure, and an 
extension of a neutral reportage privilege to private figures in 
inconsistent with binding California authority. Finally, Globe's 
article also fails to satisfy the neutral reportage requirement
6
that the article be published in an accurate and disinterested 
manner
Third, Mr. Khawar is entitled to punitive damages because 
there is clear and convincing evidence that Globe’s article was 
published with actual malice. Actual malice exists when a 
publisher has serious doubts as to the truth of its publication 
but publishes anyway. This Court should give deference to the 
jury’s finding of actual malice for three reasons. First, Globe 
irresponsibly relied on unreliable sources for its article. 
Second, Globe made almost no attempt to acquire knowledge of 
facts which would have confirmed the falsity of its article. 




I. THE COURT OF APPEAL PROPERLY RULED THAT MR. KHAWAR WAS A 
PRIVATE FIGURE.
This Court should affirm the lower court's holding that Mr. 
Khawar was a private figure. Those who attain the status of 
public figure "have assumed roles of especial prominence in the 
affairs of society" such that their actions "invite attention 
and comment." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 354 
(1974). Three classes of individuals qualify for public figure 
status. See id. at 345-51. First, individuals who occupy 
positions of pervasive power and influence are termed "all­
purpose public figures." Id. at 351. Second, individuals who 
"thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public 
controversies ... to influence the resolution of the issues" 
are termed "limited-purpose public figures." Id. at 345.
Third, individuals who are "drawn into" public controversies are 
termed "involuntary limited-purpose public figures." Id. at 
351.
Whether someone is a public figure is a question of law to 
be reviewed de novo. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n Inc., 
578 F.2d 427, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 443 
U.S. 157 (1979).
A. Mr. Khawar was not an Involuntary Limited-Purpose
Public Figure because this Status is Inconsistent 
with a United States Supreme Court Trend, the 
Court's Rationale for Establishment of the Public
Figure Category, and the Facts of this Case.
Involuntary public figure status is obtained by individuals
who "through no purposeful action of [their] own" are drawn into
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a public controversy. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. Such instances
are "exceedingly rare" because of the plaintiff's lack of 
voluntary conduct and lack of media access. Id. at 344-45.
Here, this Court should follow the United States Supreme 
Court trend indicating the involuntary public figure status has 
been abandoned. This Court should reject the involuntary public 
figure status because it also conflicts with the Supreme Court’s 
rationale in establishing the public figure class. Even if the 
involuntary public figure status exists, the facts of this case 
render the doctrine inapplicable.
1 Tbic: r.nurt Should Comport with the United States 
q>ipK^TnP Court Trend Abandoning the Involuntary 
Public Figure Status.
A United States Supreme Court trend indicates an 
abandonment of the involuntary public figure status. Dale
K. Nichols, The Involuntary Public Figure Class of Gertz v. 
Robert Welch: na.d or Merely Dorman^, 14 U.Mich.J.L.Reform 71, 
84 (1980). Three facts support this trend. See First, a
test for an involuntary public figure class does not exist. ^ 
id^ Second, "the Court has consistently and conspicuously 
deleted involuntary public figure references from its opinions. 
Third, the court has "avoided discussing involuntary publi
figure issues properly before it.
The united States Supreme Court has failed to construct a
test setting forth the elements of an involuntary public figure 
status. S^ i^ Even in Ger^, where the Court delineated the 
different forms of public figures, an involuntary public figure 
class was "tenuously suggested" with no mention of its requisite
1C
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elements. Nichols, supra, at 84. Without a clear test for an
involuntary public figure, this Court has no meaningful standard 
by which to gauge Mr. Khawar's conduct.
Likewise, by removing references of an involuntary public 
figure status from its decisions and by avoiding discussion of 
the status in relevant situations, the Court has abandoned the 
category. Wolston, 443 U.S. 157; Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
443 U.S. Ill (1979). In Wolston, the defendant wrote and 
published a book falsely naming the plaintiff a Soviet spy. 443 
U.S. at 168. The defendant argued that the plaintiff was an 
involuntary public figure due to his involvement in a grand jury 
investigation and his identification as a Soviet agent in a FBI 
report. See id. at 165-66. The Court never mentioned the 
involuntary public figure class. See id. at 164. Instead, the 
Court only referred to the "all-purpose" and "voluntary limited 
purpose" categories. See id. at 164, 168.
Discussion of an involuntary public figure class was also 
absent from the Supreme Court's decision in Hutchinson, 443 U.S. 
111. The Hutchinson Court refused to impose public figure 
status on a professor whose work was publicized as an example of 
wasteful government spending. Id. at 134-36. In its opinion, 
the Court made no reference to the involuntary public figure 
class. Like Wolston, the Court construed Gertz as establishing 
only two categories of public figures: the general and limited- 
purpose public figures. See id. at 134, The Court failed to 
apply, or even discuss, the involuntary public figure issue 
despite the plaintiff's "likely Candida[cy] for that status." 
Nichols, supra, at 82. The Court's decision not to discuss the
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category weighs heavily against the involuntary status' 
continued viability.
2. California Should Reject an Involuntary Public
Figure Status Because it Fails to Comport with the
Supreme Court's Rationale for Establishment of the
Public Figure Category.
An involuntary public figure status does not comport with 
the Gertz rationale. In Gertz, the Supreme Court recognized two 
justifications for public figure status, (1) public figures have 
"voluntarily exposed themselves to an increased risk of injury 
from defamatory falsehood[s] ..." and (2) public figures have 
more significant access to channels of communication that enable 
them to rebut defamatory accusations. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
The Gertz Court found "voluntariness" to be a vital 
requisite for public figure status. Id. at 345. The Court's 
use of the words "expose," "involvement," "thrust," and engage" 
all point to the importance of voluntariness in making public 
figure determinations. Id. An involuntary public figure, by 
definition, fails to comport with the voluntariness requirement. 
An involuntary public figure does not "expose," "involve[]," 
"thrust," nor "engage" himself in a public controversy. Id. 
Thus, an involuntary public figure status does not comport with 
the Gertz Court rationale and should be rejected.
Moreover, finding Mr. Khawar an involuntary public figure 
could have dramatic consequences. Private individuals whose 
pictures are taken near a public controversy could be implicated 
by the media with immunity from defamation actions. For 
instance, any private individual captured on film the night of
11
3. Even if this Court Finds that an Involuntary 
Public Figure Status Exists, the Facts of this
Case Render the Doctrine Inapplicable.
Mr. Khawar is not an involuntary limited-purpose public 
figure. Unlike the plaintiff in Wolston, Mr. Khawar was not the 
subject of an official criminal investigation. (R.T. 931-32.) 
Mr, Khawar was a mere bystander the night of Senator Kennedy's 
assassination. (R.T. 1341.) Although Mr. Khawar did step onto 
a stage to have his picture taken next to the Senator, he never 
entered the pantry area where the Senator was eventually killed. 
(R.T. 1339, 1341.) Even if Mr. Khawar took a more active role 
the night of Senator Kennedy's assassination, his mere 
involvement in the important issue is insufficient to attain 
involuntary public figure status. See Wolston, 433 U.S. at 165.
Furthermore, in Hutchinson the plaintiff was not an 
involuntary public figure although he was drawn out of his 
laboratory and into the spotlight by the defendant's statements. 
443 U.S. at 111. Mr. Khawar was also drawn into the spotlight 
by Globe's defamatory accusation that he was a member of the 
Iranian secret police that killed Senator Robert Kennedy. (C.T. 
3145.) Based on the Supreme Court's decision in Hutchinson, Mr. 
Khawar should not be found an involuntary public figure.
the 1996 Olympic bombing could be implicated by the media as an
involuntary public figure. Anyone present at the event, and
captured on film, could be branded by the media as a terrorist.
Surely, the Supreme Court did not intend to give the media such
unchecked discretion.
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B. The Nature and Extent of Mr. Khawar's Participation is 
Insufficient to Justify Limited-Purpose Public Figure
Status»
Whether a private individual attains limited-purpose public 
figure status depends on "the nature and extent of an 
individual's participation in the particular controversy giving 
rise to the defamation." Gertz, 418 U.S, at 352. There is an 
initial presumption that the defamed plaintiff is a private 
individual. See Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 37 F.3d 
1541, 1552 {4th Cir. 1994). To rebut this presumption, the 
defendant must show two elements: (1) that the plaintiff 
voluntarily injected himself into a public controversy in order 
to influence its outcome, and (2) the plaintiff must have 
regular and continuing access to the media. See Gertz, 418 U.S. 
at 344-45. These factors are resolved by considering the 
evidence in light of the totality of the circiimstances. See 
Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal, 3d 244, 255 
(1984).
When considering the nature and extent of Mr. Khawar's 
activities, this Court should find that Globe failed to prove 
that Mr. Khawar attained a limited-purpose public figure status. 
Viewed in the totality of the circumstances, Mr. Khawar did not 
voluntarily thrust himself into the public controversy, did not 
seek to influence its resolution, and failed to enjoy the 





1. Mr. Khawar did not Voluntarily Thrust Himself into 
a Role of Special Prominence/ nor did he Seek to 
Influence the Resolution or Outcome of a Public
Controversy,
To be classified as a limited-purpose public figure, a 
private individual must voluntarily "thrust [himself] to the 
forefront of [a] particular public controversy" in an effort to 
influence the resolution of the issues. Gertz, 418 U.S, at 345, 
In furtherance of this goal, the individual must assume a role 
of special prominence. See id. at 351. Special prominence 
requires that the individual be at the forefront of the public 
controversy so as to invite public attention and comment. See 
id. at 345. Merely "becoming involved in or associated with a 
matter that attracts public attention" is insufficient to obtain 
limited-purpose public figure status. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 167.
An individual does not thrust himself into a public 
controversy by mere affiliation with an event that attracts 
publicity. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351-52. In Gertz, an 
attorney voluntarily represented a family in a civil suit 
against a policeman charged with the murder of their son. Id. 
at 325, A subsequent magazine article alleged that the civil 
suit was part of the attorney's Communist plan to discredit the 
police. See id. at 325-26. The article accused the attorney of 
framing the police and named the attorney a "Leninist" and a 
"Communist-fronter." Id.
Although the attorney voluntarily associated himself with a 
case which he knew would attract extensive publicity, the Gertz 
Court concluded that the attorney was a private figure. I^
The Court determined that the "nature and extent" of the
14
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lawyer's participation was limited to his representation of his 
client. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325-26, The Court held that the 
attorney "did not voluntarily thrust himself into the vortex" of 
the public controversy, nor did he attempt to generate public 
interest to influence its outcome. Id, at 351-52.
Similarly, individuals who are dragged into a public 
controversy do not achieve limited-purpose public figure status. 
See, e.g,, Wolston, 443 U.S. at 166. In Wolston, a Russian-born 
naturalized citizen failed to respond to a grand jury subpoena 
in a Soviet espionage investigation. Id. at 162. Sixteen years 
later, the defendant publisher referred to the plaintiff as a 
Soviet agent. See id. at 159. The Court refused to label the 
plaintiff a limited-purpose public figure. See id. at 166. The 
Court determined that the plaintiff's decision "not to appear 
before the grand jury, knowing that his action might be attended 
by publicity," was not decisive of public-figure status. Id. at 
166. The Wolston Court held that the plaintiff was "dragged 
unwillingly into the controversy," and that his actions did not 
"justify the conclusion , . , that [the plaintiff] 'voluntarily 
thrust' or 'injected' himself into the forefront of the public 
controversy . . , Id.
Likewise, Mr. Khawar did not voluntarily thrust himself to 
the forefront of Senator Kennedy's assassination. Mr. Khawar 
was not a public figure due to his mere proximity to the events 
which resulted in the assassination of Senator Kennedy. Mr. 
Khawar's involvement in Senator Kennedy's assassination was 
limited to his attendance at the Kennedy presidential campaign 
rally and appearance on the stage near the presidential
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candidate. {R.T. 1339.) Although Mr. Khawar decided to stand 
on the stage behind the Senator, this action is insufficient to 
satisfy the "voluntary thrust" element required by Gertz. (R.T. 
1339.) Mr. Khawar made no voluntary attempt to influence the 
resolution of Senator Kennedy's assassination. Rather, Mr. 
Khawar was unwillingly dragged into the controversy by Globe's 
defamatory article. These actions are insufficient to 
constitute limited-purpose public figure status.
2. Mr. Khawar did not Enjoy the Requisite Access to 
Effective Channels of Media Communication.
Mr. Khawar did not enjoy the requisite access to effective 
channels of media communication. In contrast to a private 
figure, a public figure must have significantly greater access 
to the media and thus a better opportunity to refute defamatory 
statements. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. This access must be 
"regular and continuing." Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 136. Mere 
access to the media is insufficient to obtain a limited-purpose 
public figure status. See Time, Inc, v. Firestone, 424 U.S.
448, 455 (1975).
In Firestone, the plaintiff was involuntarily hauled into 
court when her wealthy husband initiated a divorce proceeding. 
Id. at 453. During the proceeding, which attracted heavy media 
attention, the plaintiff held several press conferences. See 
id. at 455, 486. The Court reasoned that there was "no 
indication that she sought to use the press conferences as a 
vehicle by which to thrust herself to the forefront of some 
[public controversy] in order to influence its resolution." See 
id.
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Mr. Khawar's minimal media access does not make him a 
public figure. In fact, Mr. Khawar's access to the media was 
less than the plaintiff in Firestone, who was found to be a 
private figure. Unlike the plaintiff in Firestone, Mr. Khawar 
was not wealthy and was thus unable to call press conferences to 
rebut Globe's accusations. As a small-town potato farmer, Mr. 
Khawar had no interest in attracting the publicity he received 
through Globe's article. (R.T. 1355, 1362.) The publicity that 
resulted was uninvited and unwelcome. (R.T. 1362-65.) Mr. 
Khawar's lack of access to the media thus confirms his status as 
a private figure.
Regular and continued access to the media is a requisite to 
becoming a public figure. See Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 136. A 
single response to a defamatory accusation does not constitute 
"regular and continuing access." Id. For example, in 
Hutchinson a professor responded to derogatory remarks made by a 
senator who singled-out the professor's studies as an example of 
governmental waste. Id. at 136. The scope of the professor's 
access to the media consisted of newspaper and wire service 
reports through which he responded to the defamation. See id. 
at 134. Because the access came only after the alleged libel, 
and ceased once the controversy was over, the Court found that 
the professor did not have "the regular and continuing access to 
the media that is one of the accouterments of having become a 
public figure." Id.
Likewise, Mr. Khawar did not have regular and continued 
access to the media. Mr. Khawar made only a single response to 
Globe's defamatory charges. (R.T. 1369.) Mr. Khawar's response
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also came after the alleged libel occurred. (R.T. 1368.)
Unlike the plaintiff in Firestone, Mr. Khawar did not seek the 
press nor did he call press conferences. Instead, by 
reluctantly acquiescing to a single local television interview, 
Mr. Khawar limited his media access. (R.T. 1368.) Moreover, 
while Mr. Khawar's access was limited to a local television 
station. Globe's article had national and international 
ramifications. (R.T. 1366-67.) Mr. Khawar did not have either 
national or international media access through which to 
adequately rebut the damage to his reputation. Mr, Khawar did 
not voluntarily thrust himself into the forefront of the Kennedy 
assassination, nor seek to influence its resolution through his 
singular, limited media contact. Rather, Mr. Khawar sought only 
to mollify the deleterious affects of statements by Globe on his 
reputation.
C. Even if Mr. Khawar Attained Either Involuntary or
Voluntary Limited Public Figure Status at the Time of 
Senator Kennedy's Assassination, he no Longer had thi^ 
Status Twenty-One Years Later.
Passage of time is also an important factor in determining 
public figure status. See Wolston, 443 U.S. at 170, (Black, J., 
concurring). The Supreme Court found lapse of time relevant in 
Wolston. Id. Passage of time is important for two reasons: (1) 
the passage of several years "between a controversial event and 
a libelous utterance . . . diminish[es] the defamed party's 
access to the means of counterargument[,]" and (2) the lapse of 
time diminishes whatever "public scrutiny" the purported public 
figure may have assumed. Id. at 170-71, Lapse of time should
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be considered persuasive in the determination of public figure 
status. See Naantaanbuu v. Abernathy, 816 F.Supp. 218, 223 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
In Naantaanbuu, the plaintiff was alleged to have had a 
sexual encounter with Martin Luther King, Jr., the night before 
his assassination. Id. at 221. The plaintiff was held to be a 
private figure because she had gone "some twenty-five years 
without being pulled into the controversy . . . M. at 223.
Similar to Naantaanbuu, Mr. Khawar went twenty-one years 
without being pulled into a public controversy. This lapse of 
time weighs in favor of finding Mr. Khawar a private figure at 
the time Globe published its article. Assuming, arguendo, that 
Mr. Khawar gained either involuntary or voluntary limited- 
purpose public figure status when he was present at Senator 
Kennedy's assassination in 1968, he lost that distinction by the 
time Globe published its libelous article in 1989. The lapse of 
the intervening twenty-one years militates against finding Mr. 
Khawar a public figure when the article was published. Even if 
there was a public controversy as to what happened the night of 
the assassination in 1968, the passage of the intervening 
twenty-one years, without a single mention of Mr. Khawar, 
removed the possibility of any continued public figure status.
This Court should affirm the lower court's holding that Mr. 
Khawar was a private figure. Mr. Khawar should not be deemed 
either an involuntary or voluntary limited-purpose figure. An 
involuntary public figure status is inappropriate considering 
the strong United States Supreme Court trend abandoning the 
status. The status also conflicts with the Court's rationale
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for a public figure category. Even if an involuntary public 
figure class exists, Mr. Khawar's activities were insufficient 
to render the doctrine applicable. Likewise, the voluntary 
limited-purpose class is rendered inapplicable to Mr. Khawar.
Mr. Khawar did not voluntarily thrust himself into a public 
controversy and did not have channels through which to 
effectively rebut Globe's defamatory statements. The passage of 
twenty-one years from the time of Senator Kennedy's 
assassination also distinguishes Mr. Khawar as a private figure. 
Consequently, this Court should affirm Mr. Khawar*s private 
figure status.
II. THE COURT OF APPEAL PROPERLY RULED THAT A NEUTRAL REPORTAGE
PRIVILEGE DOES NOT PROTECT GLOBE'S REPUBLICATION OF
DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS.
Globe's article is not constitutionally protected by a 
"neutral reportage privilege." As a republisher of defamatory 
statements, Globe is liable as if it was the original publisher. 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581, pp. 231 (1979). A 
minority of jurisdictions recognize a controversial exception to 
this general rule in a neutral reportage privilege. A neutral 
reportage privilege protects media defendants from defamation 
liability when they neutrally and accurately report newsworthy 
charges made by credible sources against public figures. See 
Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc., 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 
1977).
The Second Circuit first recognized a neutral reportage 
privilege in Edwards. Id. at 120. The Edwards court found the 
New York Times not liable for defamation after its accurate
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republication of defamatory statements originally made by the 
National Audubon Society. Id. at 115. The newspaper quoted
Audubon officials who identified five prominent scientists as 
"being paid to lie." at 117. The article also included
denials from three of the five defamed scientists. See id. The 
court held "[w]hen a responsible/ prominent organization like 
the National Audubon Society makes serious charges against a 
public figure, the First Amendment protects the accurate and 
disinterested reporting of those charges, regardless of the 
reporter's private views regarding their validity. j.-r 120.
Courts construe four requirements for a neutral reportage 
privilege: (1) the defamatory statement must be a newsworthy 
charge that creates or is associated with a public controversy, 
(2) the original defamatory statement must be made by a 
responsible and prominent source, (3) the defamatory statement 
must concern a public official or a public figure, and (4) the 
defamatory statement must be reported neutrally and accurately 
by the publisher. Justin Wertman, The Newsworthiness
Requirement the Privilege of Neutral Reportage is a Matter of 
Public Concern, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 789, 793 (1996).
Here, the Court of Appeal's rejection of a neutral 
reportage privilege should be affirmed. California does not 
recognize a neutral reportage privilege. Legal precedent and 
public policy militate against recognizing neutral reportage 





Neither the Supreme Court of the United States, nor this 
Court recognize a neutral reportage privilege. Nevertheless, 
two California cases are misapplied in support of the 
proposition that California has adopted a neutral reportage 
privilege.^ See Weingarten v. Block, 102 Cal. App, 3d 129 
(1980); Grillo v. Smith, 144 Cal. App. 3d 868 (1983).
In Weingarten, the court never endorsed a neutral reportage 
privilege. 102 Cal. App. 3d at 137. The plaintiff in 
Weingarten assumed a role of prominence after he was discharged 
as city attorney and retaliated by initiating a recall movement 
against city council members who voted for his dismissal. Id. 
The defendant newspaper published two articles concerning the 
plaintiff's involvement in the recall movement and his alleged 
misuse of his position to amass a considerable fortune. See id.
The Weingarten court quoted a brief passage from Edwards in 
support of a general proposition that a newspaper may print 
defamatory statements against a public figure without automatic 
liability. I^ at 148. The Weingarten court was not concerned 
with a neutral reportage privilege, but with whether the 
plaintiff was a public figure and whether the evidence was 
sufficient to support a finding of malice. Id. at 133. The
^ Stockton Newspapers, Inc, v. Superior Court, is also cited as 
recognizing a neutral reportage privilege. 206 Cal. App. 3d 966 
(1988), overruled by Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co., 48 Cal. 3d 711 
(1989). The Stockton court's vague reference to Edwards appeared in a 
footnote, and is only used to note the similarities between a neutral 
reportage privilege and California Civil Code's "public interest 
privilege." I^ at 981 n.6. Even then, however, the court recognized 
a neutral reportage privilege as contrary to the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Gertz. See Id.
A. California does not Recognize a Neutral Reportage
Privilege.
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Weingarten court never identified a neutral reportage privilege, 
nor did the court set forth the elements thereof. In sum, the 
Weingarten court gave no indication that its brief quote should 
be construed as an endorsement of the Edwards holding.
The court, in Grillo, also failed to endorse a neutral 
reportage privilege. 144 Cal. App. 3d at 871. The plaintiff, a 
municipal court judge, personally arrested a county auditor, 
held him in contempt and sentenced him to jail. See id. The 
Los Angeles Times reported the event. Like Weingarten,
the Grillo court cited to dicta from Edwards. Id. at 872. The 
Grillo court used the Edwards reference to reject the 
plaintiff's argument that a newspaper is automatically liable 
for its reports. I_^ The court ultimately found against the 
plaintiff because statements of opinion concerning the conduct 
of public officials are privileged under both California and 
United States Constitutions. See id. The court did not base 
its reasoning on the existence of a neutral reportage privilege. 
The Grillo court never mentioned a neutral reportage privilege 
by name, nor laid out the elements of the privilege thereof.
The Grillo court gave no indication that its brief quote from 
Edwards represented an endorsement of a neutral reportage 
privilege.
Neither Weingarten nor Grillo adopt a neutral reportage 
privilege. The courts' brief references to Edwards were merely 
tangential to their ultimate holdings. The references were not 
intended as wholesale endorsements of the Edwards doctrine. To 
date, California courts have not recognized a neutral reportage
privilege.
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A neutral reportage privilege is inconsistent with 
defamation jurisprudence and is unduly burdensome to recovery. 
Accordingly, several courts and legal scholars criticize and 
reject a neutral reportage privilege. See Dickey v. CBS Inc., 
583 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir. 1978); see also Dennis J. Dobbels,
Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc,: A Constitutional
Privilege to Republish Defamation Should Be Rejected, 33 
Hastings L.J. 1203 (1982), Rejecting jurisdictions find a 
neutral reportage privilege (1) in conflict with Supreme Court 
defamation jurisprudence, and (2) an unduly burdensome obstacle 
to recovery.
1. A Neutral Reportage Privilege is in Conflict with 
Supreme Court Defamation Jurisprudence.
Courts that explicitly reject a neutral reportage privilege 
find it in conflict with United States Supreme Court defamation 
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Dickey, 583 F.2d at 1225-26. In 
Dickey, the media defendant repeated defamatory charges against 
a congressional candidate. Id. at 1223-24. The defendant 
asserted that a neutral reportage privilege protected its 
republication. See id. The Third Circuit quickly rejected the 
defendant's invitation to adopt the privilege. See id. at 1225. 
The Dickey court found a neutral reportage privilege in conflict 
with United States Supreme Court decisions in both St. Amant v. 
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968), and Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348. 
Dickey, 583 F.2d at 1225-26.
B. Legal Precedent and Public Policy Militate Against
Recognizing a Neutral Reportage Privilege.
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a. A Neutral Reportage Privilege is in Conflict
with St. Amant v. Thompson.
This Court should find a neutral reportage privilege in 
conflict with the United States Supreme Court’s holding in St. 
Amant. The First Amendment prohibits a public figure or 
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood 
unless they prove that the statement was made with "actual 
malice." See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264- 
65 (1964). In St. Amant, the Court held that actual malice 
exists when the defendant "entertains serious doubts as to the 
truth of his publication," and publishes despite these doubts. 
390 U.S. at 731. A neutral reportage privilege protects the 
republication of defamatory accusations even when the reporter 
entertains serious doubts as to the publication's validity. See 
Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120. Thus, a neutral reportage privilege 
would protect a media defendant from liability, even if the 
defendant satisfied the Supreme Court's actual malice standard.
A neutral reportage privilege should therefore be rejected as 
inconsistent with Supreme Court defamation jurisprudence.
b. A Neutral Reportage Privilege is in Conflict 
with Gertz v. Robert Welch^ Jnc..
A neutral reportage privilege is also inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court's holding in Gertz. A neutral reportage privilege 
requires that the defamatory statement be a newsworthy charge 
that creates or is associated with a public controversy.
Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120. In Gertz, however, the Supreme Court 
repudiated a "newsworthiness test" as a basis for determining 
whether the First Amendment protects a defamatory publication.
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Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345''48. The Court recognized that a
newsworthiness analysis fails to accommodate the state's 
interest in protecting individual reputation. See id. at 346. 
Instead, the Court concluded that the public or private status 
of the accused is the proper standard in defamation actions.
See id.
The Court again rejected a newsworthiness test in 
Firestone. 424 U.S. at 455-56. There, the plaintiff sued after
the defendant inaccurately reported on her divorce proceeding. 
See id. at 452. The defendant argued that the publication was 
newsworthy and thus privileged. See id. The Court rejected 
this argument in favor of a test focusing on the plaintiff's 
public or private status. See id. at 455-56.
The Supreme Court repudiated newsworthiness as a basis for 
applying First Amendment protection. Accordingly, a neutral 
reportage privilege should not afford media defendants absolute 
immunity to report newsworthy defamatory statements. Legal 
scholars note that "the Edwards decision epitomizes a common 
misconception in constitutional law, that certain [newsworthy] 
defamatory statements are inherently worthy of First Amendment 
protection." Dobbels, supra, at 1224. When rejecting the 
newsworthiness test in Gertz and Firestone, the Court balanced 
countervailing interests in free speech and privacy by focusing 




article. Because newsworthiness is a basis for a neutral
reportage privilege, and the Court has repudiated such a test,
the privilege is at odds with defamation jurisprudence and
2should therefore be rejected.
2, A Neutral Reportage Privilege is an Unduly
Burdensome Obstacle to Recovery.
Considering that "[d]efamation defendants now have a 
panoply of constitutional protections," a neutral reportage 
privilege is an unduly burdensome obstacle to recovery. Brown, 
48 Cal. 3d at 747; accord Postill v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 325 
N.W. 2d 511, 518 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (declining to recognize a 
neutral reportage privilege because the press is adequately 
protected). The actual malice standard is a basis for many 
barriers in defamation recovery. See Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 747, 
Actual malice makes recovery for defamation extremely 
difficult. Public figures must prove "actual malice" to recover 
damages. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 254. Private figures 
must also prove actual malice when seeking punitive damages.
See id. at 347. Actual malice requires proof that the defendant 
had knowledge of the article's falsity or acted with reckless 
disregard for the truth. See at 254, This must be shown by 
the stringent clear and convincing evidence standard. See 
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352. Furthermore, recovery is more difficult
^ Several other jurisdictions recognized Edwards as inconsistent 
with Supreme Court jurisprudence. See Newell v. Fields Enters. Inc., 
415 N.E.2d 434, 452 (Ill. App. 3d 1980) ("Constitutional protection of 
the press from libel actions turns on the status of the plaintiff, 
regardless of the subject matter of the publication. ); see also Hogan 
V. Herald Co., 444 N.E.2d 1002, 1014 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) ("It is not 
possible to reconcile [the privilege of neutral reportage] with [the 
Supreme Court's] prior decision in Gertz. ).
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because "an appellate court must independently review all the 
evidence on the issue of actual malice." Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 
747. These hurdles make defamation recovery burdensome enough 
without the additional obstacle of a neutral reportage 
privilege.
Even without a neutral reportage privilege, the media is 
sufficiently protected against defamation actions. See id. at 
750. As this Court recognized, "only about ten percent of all 
libel suits are pursued seriously." Id. Moreover, only about 
one percent of all libel cases are fully tried/ and as to that 
one percent, nearly seventy percent are overturned on appeal.
See id. This is overwhelming evidence that a defamation victim 
faces "almost insurmountable obstacles to recovery . . . Id.
at 751. An additional obstacle to recovery is therefore 
unnecessary and unduly burdensome.
C. This Court Need not Adopt or Reject a Neutral Reportage 
Privilege because the Facts of this Case Render the
Doctrine Inapplicable.
Even if this Court acknowledges a neutral reportage 
privilege, the facts of this case render such a doctrine 
inapplicable. Courts articulate four elements to a neutral 
reportage privilege: (1) the defamatory statement must be a 
newsworthy charge that creates or is associated with a public 
controversy, (2) the original defamatory statement must be made 
by a responsible and prominent source, (3) the defamatory 
statement must concern a public figure, and (4) the defamatory 
statement must be reported neutrally and accurately by the 
publisher. S^, e.g., Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639
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F.2d 54, 69-70 (2ci Cir. 1988). Even assuming, arguendo, that 
Globe's article related to a public controversy, the defamatory 
republication fails to satisfy requirements two, three and four 
Of a neutral reportage privilege.
1. Defamatory Statements Republished by Globe did not- 
Originate from a Responsible and Prominent Source?
Globe fails to satisfy the neutral reportage requirement 
that the original defamatory accusations be made by a 
"responsible and prominent source." Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120. 
Courts which relax the responsible and prominent source 
requirement still require the original source to be a "named 
individual." Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F.Supp. 1110, 1130 (N.D. 
Cal. 1984). The reasoning behind the responsible and prominent 
limitation is that it increases the likelihood that the 
accusations are true. See Wertman, supra, at 789. Without the 
responsible and prominent requirement, the media "would have 
absolute immunity to espouse and concur in the most unwarranted 
attacks . . • made by persons known to be of scant reliability." 
Cianci, 639 F.2d at 69-70.
In the instant case, Globe republished defamatory 
accusations that originated from unreliable sources. (R.T. 870, 
2152.) Globe irresponsibly relied on information from Robert 
Morrow, a minor conspiracy theorist, who obtained his 
information from an unnamed intelligence operative. (R.T. 870.) 
Unlike Edwards, where a prominent source made the original 
defamatory accusations, Morrow is rated as having "zero 
credibility" by his peers. (R.T. 2152.) Even more disturbing
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is the fact that Morrow is an ex-felon who was convicted in a 
Federal Court for counterfeiting, (R.T. 850.) Morrow's 
personal credibility certainly does not satisfy the "respectable 
and prominent" requirement as envisioned by a neutral reportage 
privilege. Furthermore, the original accusations against Mr. 
Khawar were not made by Morrow, but by an "unnamed" intelligence 
operative, (R.T. 870.) The Globe made no attempt to interview 
or scrutinized Morrow's unnamed source. (R.T. 1121.) Because 
the original source of the defamatory accusations was not named, 
the article fails to satisfy the "responsible and prominent" 
requirement of a neutral reportage privilege.
2. Defamatory Accusations Republished by Globe were
not Directed at a Public Figure.
Globe's article also fails to satisfy the neutral reportage 
requirement that the defamatory charges be directed at a public 
figure. While a small minority of jurisdictions extend a 
neutral reportage privilege to private individuals such an 
extension is inconsistent, with binding California authority.
See Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 729-56.
a. A Neutral Reportage Privilege Requires that
the Defamatory Accusations be Directed at a
Public Figure.
A vast majority of courts only apply the neutral reportage 
privilege where a public figure is involved. See, e.g., Dixson
V. Newsweek, 562 F.2d 626 (10th Cir. 1977). In Dixson, the 
Tenth Circuit recognized a neutral reportage privilege, but held 
it inapplicable against the private figure plaintiff. Id. at
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628. The Dixson court balanced society's interest in free press 
against the importance of individual reputation and held: "The 
protections afforded the press when it reports on . . . public 
figures do not shield it from liability when it publishes 
defamatory statements concerning private individuals." 562 F,2d 
at 631, Here, Globe published defamatory statements against Mr. 
Khawar, a private figure. Thus, Globe should not be allowed to 
use a neutral reportage privilege as a shield against liability.
b. A Neutral Reportage Privilege that Extends to 
Private Individuals is Inconsistent with 
California Defamation Jurisprudence.
A small minority of jurisdictions inappropriately extend a 
neutral reportage privilege to private individuals. See, e.q., 
April V. Reflector Herald Inc., 546 N.E.2d 466 (Ohio Ct. App, 
1988). In April, an Ohio Court of Appeal held the doctrine of 
neutral reportage protected a media defendant's defamatory 
charges against a part-time cook. Id. at 471, The Ohio court 
found "no legitimate difference" between private and public 
plaintiffs. Id. at 469.
This outcome is inconsistent with binding California 
authority. See Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 756. Pursuant to the 
Supreme Court's decision in Gertz, California recognizes a 
legitimate difference between public and private individuals. 
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45; Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 756. In Brown, 
this Court rejected an expansion of California Civil Code's 
"public interest privilege" from public to private figures. 48 
Cal. 3d at 729-56. In Brown, this Court found the importance of 
private reputation to outweigh society's interest in a free
31
press. Id. at 742-46. Accordingly, the Brown Court rejected an 
expansion of the public interest privilege because of the 
importance of reputation. Id. at 742-56.
The same rationale is appropriate here. The public's 
interest in the news does not justify an extension of a neutral 
reportage privilege to private individuals. The importance of 
individual reputation, as protected under the California 
Constitution, must be considered. See id. at 743. Article I 
section 2, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution, 
"reflects a considerable determination that the individual's 
interest in reputation is worthy of Constitutional protection." 
See id. at 746. Given the media's "vast resources to inflict 
untoward damage upon an individual[,]" Mr. Khawar deserves this 
Court's protection. at 743 (quoting Miami Herald Pub. Co.
V- Ane, 423 So.2d 387, 394 (1982)). This is especially true 
given that defamation actions "represent the individual's sole 
remedy against the occasional excess of the print." See id. In 
light of this Court's reasoning in Brown, this Court should 
reject an extension of a neutral reportage privilege to private 
individuals such as Mr. Khawar.
3. Defamatory Statements Republished by the Globe
were not "Accurately and Disinterestedly"
Reported.
Globe's article also fails to satisfy the neutral reportage 
requirement that a media defendant present an "accurate and 
disinterested" report. An accurate and disinterested report 
presents both sides of a public controversy in a fair and 
balanced manner. See Cianci, 639 F.2d at 69.
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In Cianci, the Second Circuit found the defendant's article 
defamatory because the defendant did not present both sides of 
the issue. Id. at 69. The defendant failed to include the 
victim's "claim of innocence," "[o]btain [the victim's] version 
of the facts," or reveal facts undermining the credibility "of 
key sources in the story," Id. The Cianci court reasoned that 
a balanced report ensures that a publisher merely reports on a 
controversial event. Id. at 69-70. Without balance, a reporter 
may present a heavily biased article that inappropriately fans 
the flames of a public controversy. See id.
Like the defendant in Cianci, Globe failed to publish a 
balanced report and thus failed to satisfy the accurate and 
disinterested requirement. Globe did not include Mr. Khawar's 
claim of innocence. (C.T. 3145.) Globe made almost no effort 
to obtain Mr. Khawar's version of the facts. (R.T. 1121.)
Globe also irresponsibly refrained from including facts that 
could have discredited the defamatory accusations made against 
Mr. Khawar. (C.T. 3145.) Specifically, Globe failed to mention 
that: (1) Morrow is an ex-felon, (2) Sirhan Sirhan was convicted 
for the death of Robert F. Kennedy, (3) this Court affirmed 
Sirhan Sirhan's conviction, and (4) Sirhan Sirhan admitted to 
killing Robert Kennedy and never mentioned receiving help from a 
Pakistani journalist. (C.T. 3145.)
Globe also took several positive acts designed to influence 
the defamatory publication. The trial court found Globe 
centered, retouched, lightened and increased the size of the 
picture so as to make Mr. Khawar identifiable. (C.T. 3145, R.T. 
2744.) Globe also added an arrow to the picture pointing
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directly to Mr. Khawar. (C.T. 3145, R.T, 2744.) Globe's 
interest was not in providing a fair and accurate account of the 
facts. Globe's article was biased and heavily unbalanced. 
Therefore, this Court should find the accurate and disinterested 
requirement unsatisfied and a neutral reportage privilege 
inapplicable.
In sum, a neutral reportage privilege does not protect 
Globe's republication of defamatory accusations. California 
courts do not recognize a neutral reportage privilege. Legal 
precedent and public policy militate against recognizing a 
neutral reportage privilege, and the facts of this case render 
such a doctrine inapplicable. Accordingly, this Court should 
affirm the Court of Appeal's finding that Globe's defamatory 
republication is not shielded by a neutral reportage privilege.
III. THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT GLOBE'S 
ARTICLE WAS PUBLISHED WITH ACTUAL MALICE.
To recover damages, a public figure must prove actual 
malice. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 264-65. When seeking 
punitive damages, private figures must also prove actual malice. 
See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350. Actual malice, or reckless 
disregard for the truth, must be determined through case-by-case 
analysis. See Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton, 491 
U.S. 657, 686 (1989). Actual malice exists when the "defendant 
in fact entertain[s] serious doubts as to the truth of [the] 
publication," but publishes despite these doubts. St. Amant,
390 U.S. at 731.
Several circumstances may give rise to serious doubts and 
may be construed as bad faith establishing actual malice. See
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Reader's Digest, 37 Cal. 3d at 257. Actual malice exists where 
a publisher's allegations are so inherently improbable that only 
a reckless man would have put them in circulation. See St. 
Ama^, 390 U.S. at 732. Similarly, actual malice may be found 
"where there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the 
informant or the accuracy of his reports." Id. Circumstantial 
evidence can be used to prove actual malice. See Reader^ s 
Digest, 37 Cal. 3d at 257.
The evidence here indicates that actual malice exists.
Globe made deliberate decisions not to acquire knowledge of 
facts confirming the probable falsity of its article. (R.T. 
1121.) Globe relied on unreliable sources for its information. 
(R.T. 870, 2152.) Globe also published an article that was 
false and highly improbable on its face. (C.T. 3145.) 
Accordingly, Mr. Khawar is entitled to punitive damages.
A. This Court Should Give Deference to the Jurv^s Factual 
Finding that Globe Published its Article with Actual 
Malice.
This Court should give deference to the jury's factual 
determination that Globe published its article with actual 
malice. Reviewing courts should consider the factual record in 
full when determining whether actual malice exists. See Harte- 
Hanks, 491 U.S. at 688. De novo review only applies to jury 
verdicts where there is great danger that the jury will find for 
the plaintiff out of sympathy, or find against the defendant out 
of hostility to the defendant's speech. Oilman v. Evans,
750 F.2d 970, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring). 
Credibility determinations should be viewed under the clearly-
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erroneous standard because the trier of fact has the opportunity 
to observe the demeanor of witnesses. See Bose Corp. v.
Consumer's Union^ 466 U.S. 485, 499-500 (1984).
Here, deference should be given to the jury's factual 
findings. The jury had a first-hand opportunity to evaluate 
witness credibility. De novo review is improper because there 
is no indication that: (1) the jury found for Mr, Khawar out of 
sympathy, or (2) the jury found against the defendant out of 
hostility to Globe's article. Deference should thus be given to 
the finder of fact and the jury's finding should be reversed 
only if this Court finds the jury was in clear error.
B. Globe Acted with Actual Malice Because of its
Deliberate Failure to Confirm the Probable Falsity of 
its Article.
Globe acted with reckless disregard for the truth when it 
failed to confirm the validity of its article. A "deliberate 
decision not to acquire knowledge of facts that might confirm 
the probable falsity of charges," supports a finding of actual 
malice. Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 692. Inaction is a product of 
reckless disregard for the truth, and thus, actual malice. See 
id.
The failure to interview witnesses and investigate evidence 
that may corroborate a story establishes actual malice. See 
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 157 (1967). In 
Curtis, a newspaper published an unreliable informant's false 
description of a university athletic director's purported 
agreement to fix a college football game. Id. at 136. The 
media defendant did not interview witnesses that could have
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corroborated the story. See Curtis, 388 U.S. at 157, in
addition, the newspaper never reviewed film of the event that 
would have revealed what actually happened at the game. See id. 
The Court ultimately found the newspaper liable. See id. at 
169-70. Inaction served as evidence of the newspaper's actual 
malice. See id. at 157.
Similarly, Globe's inaction establishes actual malice. The 
article's author, Mr. Blackburn, failed to contact the person 
called "Ahmand" in Mr. Morrow's book. (R.T, 1121.) While Mr. 
Blackburn testified that he believed that he checked with Los 
Angeles directory assistance, his notes reflect no such attempt. 
(R.T. 1121, 1096-97.) When weighing Mr. Blackburn's 
credibility, the jury found his inaction sufficient to justify 
actual malice. (A.C.T 2782.) The jury's review of witness 
credibility should not be overturned here.
Even assuming, arguendo. Globe made an unsuccessful attempt 
to find Mr. Khawar, its inquiry should not have stopped there. 
Globe did not review the Los Angeles Police Department archives, 
nor the FBI archives. (R.T. 1121.) Globe did not interview 
anyone present at the event. (R.T. 1121.) Finally, like the 
newspaper in Curtis, Globe did not review film of the 
assassination which would have revealed that Mr. Khawar was not 
present when Senator Kennedy was shot. (R.T. 1121.) Globe's 
inaction is clear and convincing evidence that it published its 




C. Globe Acted with Actual Malice Because its Article was 
Glaringly False and Absurd,
Globe's article was absolutely untrue and absurd. An 
article that is false, or that is highly improbable on its face, 
is published with actual malice. See Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 
691; Carson v. Allied News, 529 F.2d 206, 213 (7th Cir. 1975).
In Carson, the Seventh Circuit held that a tabloid's 
fabricated assertions about the move of Johnny Carson's Tonight 
Show from New York to Los Angeles evidenced actual malice. 529 
F.2d at 213. The tabloid's article was loosely based on a 
Chicago newspaper story. See id. at 210. The tabloid's 
accusations were held to be "completely fabricated" and highly 
improbable on their face. See id. at 212.
Here, Globe's article is also completely fabricated and 
highly improbable on its face. The Globe article claims Iranian 
secret agents killed Senator Kennedy. (C.T. 3145.) Globe's 
article claims that the Iranian agents were hired by the Mafia. 
(C.T. 3145.) The article claims that the Mafia was responsible 
for President Kennedy's death. (C.T. 3145.) The article also 
claims that Senator Kennedy was, actually, shot by a "camera 
that was really a gun." (C.T. 3145.) These assertions, are 
false and improbable given that Sirhan Sirhan was arrested and 
convicted for the murder of Senator Kennedy. (R.T. 800.) Based 
on these facts, the jury found Globe's article was published 
with actual malice. (A.C.T, 2782.)
Globe's article is the product of a conspiracy theorist's 
imagination and has no basis in reality. The evidence indicates 
that Globe published its article with actual malice. Globe did
38
not acquire knowledge of facts confirming the probable fals
of its article. (R.T. 1121.) Globe relied on unreliable
sources for its information. (r.t. 870, 2152.) Globe also 
published an article that was false and highly improbable on its 
face. (C.T. 3145.) Accordingly, this Court should affirm the 
jury’s finding that Globe published its article with actual 
malice,
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeal's decision 
affirming the lower court's rulings, should be affirmed.
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